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I .Introduction
In recent years, a considerable body of economic analysis has
focussed on the positive theory of macroeconomic policymaking. In
one strand of this literature, policy choices are assumed to be
made by a policy authority with a well defined and stable
objective function.Policy choices are then governed by the
maximization of the objective function, subject to the structure
of the economy. An example of this approach is Barro (1979), who
considers the optimal interteniporal choice of budget deficits by a
government attempting to minimize the excess burden of taxation.
Another approach emphasizes the competition of interest groups on
government policymaking.Instead of assuming that policymakers
maximize a single, well-defined objective function, governments
are assumed to respond to the lobbying or rent-seeking activity of
competing interest groups, with policies outcomes a function of
the extent of lobbying and the political influence of various
rival interests. Examples of this approach may be found in
several studies on the formation of tariff policy in the United
1 States
While these analyses have yielded important insights, both
approaches are clearly flawed as models of policy formation. The
first approach completely ignores the ongoing competition for
political power among rival interests that characterizes most
1See Baldwin (1982)2
economies. Implicitly, the approach assumes that the battle for
power has been settled once and for all, and can be summarized in
the stable objective function of the government.The second
approach treats governments as blank slates upon which particular
interest groups operate.
As usually formulated and empirically implemented, both
approaches downplay the effects of election outcomes on policy
choices. Indeed, in most cases, elections are ignored altogether
in the discussion of policy formulation. To the extent that
elections are considered, the electoral competition is typically
between candidates with identical policy platforms. Elections are
then simply a battle for the spoils of office, rather than a
competition over the choice of policies. The so-called political
business cycle (PBC) approach is of this genre
2In the PBC
models, elections matter to the extent that politicians manipulate
the probability of reelection by the timing of their policies.
Elections are not, however, viewed as offering the voters a choice
between candidates with distinct policy positions.
A third approach to modelling policy formation, known as
partisanship theory, has attracted increasing interest recently.
This third approach combines important elements of the first two
approaches. Partisanship theory begins by acknowledging the
ongoing struggle for political power among competing interest
groups, and assumes that in the industrial democracies the
2See Nordhaus (1975) and McRae (1977) for formalizations of
the political business cycle approach.3
struggle is mediated through the electoral process. In contrast
to the PBC approach, competing political parties represent
different constituencies, and therefore follow different policies
when they win elections. The success of different interest groups
in affecting public policies will depend on which political party
holds office.
The standard theoretical challenge to the commonsense view
that political parties differ is that since political parties seek
electoral victories, they are led to pursue policies in the
interest of the median voter, and are thus led to a convergence of
policies.This challenge has been undermined theoretically by
Wittman (1977) and Alesina (1986), who show that convergence to
the median voter's preferences is likely to be incomplete, for at
least two major reasons. First, assuming that there is randomness
in electoral outcomes (e.g. randomness in the preferences of
voters), parties will announce electoral strategies that are a
compromise between their own preferred policy positions, and those
of the median voter.Second, Alesina notes that if parties in
fact represent distinct constituencies, then the voters will not
fully believe that the party will stick to its promises to pursue
the median voters' favored positions after It has won an election.
Voters suspect that whatever a party announces before an election,
it will at least partly represent its particular constituents'
interests after the election.In an equilibrium with rational
voters, parties will therefore run election campaigns on distinct
platforms. Once again, convergence among parties to the position4
of the median voter will be incomplete.
The partisanship viewpoint has now been tested empirically by
several authors, starting with the important and influential work
of Hibbs (1977).The findings point nearly unaminously to the
proposition that different political parties in the United States
and Europe indeed pursue distinct macroeconomic policies while in
office. In the United States, for example, several writers,
including Alesina and Sachs (1986), Beck (1982, 1984), Chapell and
Keech (1985) and Hibbs (1977, 1985), have shown that Democratic
administrations pursue policies that give more weight than
Republican administrations to unemployment relative to inflation,
and that favor income redistribution to lower income groups. Put
in revealed preference terms, the Democratic Party objective
function is revealed to put relatively more weight on unemployment
and income redistribution than on inflation, compared with the
Republican Party objective function.
The basic insight of partisanship theory, that successive
governments are likely to differ in objectives, complicates the
positive analysis of government policymaking. Basically, the fact
that objectives will change over time adds another dimension to
the well-known problem of time consistency .Thetime consistency
problem arises because current governments generally cannot bind
the actions of successor governments. Current governments must act
The issue of the time consistency of government policy was
introduced in the macroeconomic literature by Kydland (1977) and
Kydland and Prescott (1977). For recent surveys of the large and
growing literature on time consistency see Barro (1986), Cukierman
(1985), Fischer (1986) and Rogoff (1986).5
taking into account that future governments will pursue policies
that are optimal from their own future perspective, and not from
the current perspective.Current governments may influence the
actions of future governments by leaving the economy in a
particular state (e.g. with a given structure of public debt, as
in Lucas and Stokey (1983)), but in general cannot completely bind
the actions of future governments.As is now well known, this
problem arises even when the objectives of successive governments
are unchanging through time, as long as government policies
impinge on a private sectorcharacterized by forward-looking
behavior.
The problem of influencing future actions is made more
complicated when future governments may not share the objectives
of the current government.How should Democrats behave if they
know that they may be succeeded by Republicans? How should their
optimal behavior change as the probability of a Republican
successor government increases? Consider, for example, the
problem of fighting inflation.Suppose that Democrats are leery
of fighting inflation via recession, because of the effects on
unemployment on their working-class constituents.Republicans,
meanwhile, don't mind recessions, because their coupon-clipping
constituents are unlikely to become unemployed. Should a
Democratic administration be more or less inflationary while in
office, and thus leave a higher or lower inflation rate to the
future, if the probability rises of a Republican successor?
This problem has now been studied in several specific6
examples .Alesinaand Tabellini (1987) have studied the problem
of how competition among political parties affects the choice of
budget deficits by each party when it is in power. They show that
if the two parties differ by the type of public goods that are
preferred by their respective constituencies, then political
competition leads the parties to choose larger budget deficits
than they would in the absence of political competition (i.e. if
the party were certain that it would remain in power in the
future). Persson and Svensson (1987) have studied a related
problem in which the present government chooses budget policies
knowing with certainty that it will be followed by a future
government with different fiscal policy objectives.
The goal of this paper is to present in a more general
setting the problem of optimal dynamic policy formulation with
competing political parties. The earlier papers have used
restrictive assumptions on the time horizon of the competing
parties (e.g. the two-period model of Persson and Svensson
(1987)), or on the state space of the economy (e.g. the one-
dimensional state space, with further specific restrictions, in
Alesina and Tabellini (1987)), to get specific solutions for
optimal policies by the parties.In this paper, we study a
general class of problems with three main characteristics: the two
competing political parties have quadratic intertemporal objective
functions; the probability of electoral victory for each party is
See Alesina (1986) for a seminal analysis of the choice of
monetary policy and the inflation rate in a two-party political
system.7
constant; theeconomyhas alinearstructureand a
multidimensional state space.For this general linear quadratic
problem we develop a numerical dynamic programming algorithm to
solve for optimal policies of each party taking into account the
party's objectives; the structure of the economy; the probability
of future election results; and the objectives of the other
pol1tcal party. We should highlight one key- point of the
analysis: the constant probability of reelection. By ignoring the
links between policy formation and reelection chances, we ignore
all the considerations of the PBC literature. In our models,
elections count only because they select among parties with
different objectives, and not at all because they induce parties
to select particular policies in order to improve election
chances. While our formulation has the merit of highlighting the
difference of the PBC and partisanship models, we recognize that a
combination of the two approaches would be more satisfactory.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section II introduces
the general policy optimization problem for two political parties
that alternate in power according to exogenous reelection
probabilities. It is shown that time consistent solutions for this
class of problems can be obtained through dynamic programming.
This solution technique does not generally lead to closed-form
solutions, and thus must be implemented numerically. However, in
some simple economic models, discussed in sections III and IV,
closed-form analytical solutions can be obtained using the dynamic
programming tecniques. Applications of the numerical algorithm are8
found in section V where the results of simulations on specific
models are presented. The numerical algorithm itself is presented
in detail in section VI.Concluding remarks follow in section
VII.
II.The General Optimization Problem in a Two-Party Political
Sys tern
In this section we present the general optimization problem
for an economy with two political parties parties that alternate
in power according to exogenous reelection probabilities. The
economy can be described in a very general form by the following
minimal state-space representation
Z÷1 f (Z,U ) (2.1)
=( Z,U) (2.2)
where:
Z is a vector of state variables
Ti is a vector of control variables
r is a vector of target variables
In (2.1) and (2.2), Z is a vector of state variables that
is predetermined at time t. ]n the general solution in section VI,
we expand the analysis to include a vector of non-predetermined or
"jumping variables", as commonly arises in rational expectations
models.9
Assume that instead of the traditional single social planner
there are two political parties labeled party D ("Democrat") and
party R ("Republican") characterized by different objective
functions. Elections take place at the beginning of every period t
and the elected party chooses the control variables TJ for period
t. We denote the choice of when D is in power as and we
define 1J analogously. The probability of reelection of each
party is fixed and taken as exogenous: party D is elected with
probability p and party R is elected with probability (l-p).
The objective function of the two parties is given by the
following welfare functions:
—- EtEflJt1j'R
Tj
) (2.3)
j—t
—- Et j-t
,Dr.) (2.4)
j—t
.] 3
where
is the level of welfare of party i (i= R, D)
is l/(l+6) and S is the social rate of time discount
6
is a matrix of weights on the policy targets (i=R,D)
risa vector of target variables
6In principle the rate of time preference could be different
for the two parties.10
Et is the expectation operator
The two parties are assumed to differ in the weights that they
give to different policy objectives, so that the matrices and
of target weights will differ for the two parties. Party R
chooses when in power to maximize its welfare function (2.3)
subject to the dynamic system (2.1) and (2.2) and the knowledge of
the the reelection probabilities. Party D solves a similar
optimization problem choosing to maximize its welfare function
(2.4) subject to the system (2.1) and (2.2) and the reelection
probability. We will examine menioryless closed-loopstrategies
for the two parties of the form:
u' (Zr)
(2.5)
uPt —uRt(Zr)
in which each party's equilibrium choice is a function only of the
current state. The actual selected in each period will be equal
to U1 for party i in power at time t
The above problem for the two parties can be reformulated in
terms of value functions of the two parties. In defining these
This formulation of strategies is restrictive, in that it
rules out game solutions in which the parties' moves depend on the
past history of the game in addition to the current state of the
economy. Reputational equilibria, supported by trigger strategies,
are thereby ruled out. See Fershtman (1987) for further discussion
of this point.11
value functions one should observe the crucial differences between
the case of a single social planner and the case of a two party
system. Under a single controller a unique value function Vt can
be used to define the optimization problem to be solved by the
social planner. In particular the single controller problem can be
formulated as:
Vt —Max - + V1 (Z+1) ) (2.6)
Ut
subject to (2.1) and (2.2).
The maximizationin (2.6) gives rise to a policy rule U —
U(Z).Note that if (2.1) and (2.2) are time invariant, and the
policymaker's horizon is infinite, then the V and U functions
will be time invariant functions of the state Z.
When we consider two different parties the problem becomes
more complex because we have to define four value functions, two
value functions for each party in each period: one for the case in
which the party is in power at time t and one for the case in
which the party is not in power. Let signify the value
function at time t of party j when party i is in power at time t.
For example, VRDt is the maximum welfare of party 0 when party R
is in power in period t. The equilibrium that we seek is a pair of
rulesUDt_UD(Z) and UR=UR(Z), and four value functions,
such that:12
Party D
—Max(
- + [p +(l-p)vRDt+l] ) (2.7)
R R
Dt
- R+ p VDDt+l +(l-p)VRDt+l] (2.8)
argmax(- r' +[p +(l-p)vRDt+l] (2.9)
Ut
Party R
vRRt —Max - + [pvDRt+l +(l-p)vRRt+l] )(2.10)
—- r''RD+8[p v'R+l +(l-p)VRRt+lJ (2.11)
uR(z) argmax(- r' +[p +(l-p)vRRt+l]) (2.12)
Ut
subject to:
Z÷1 =( Z,U ) (2.1)
= U) (i=R,D) (2.2')
In the infinite horizon case with (2.1) and (2.2') time invariant,
all functions and will be time invariant.13
A general algorithm for the solution of these optimization
problem for the two parties is presented in section VI. The
problem is solved through the technique of dynamic programming,
using a backward recursion procedure that does not generally lead
to closed-form solutions. However, in some simple economic models
closed-form analytical solution can be obtained using dynamic
programming techniques. In the next two sections we present and
derive analytical solutions for two specific models where closed-
form solutions are obtainable.
III. A Simple Closed Economy Two-Party Model
Consider the following "inflation game" of Alesina (1986)
which extends the framework of Barro and Gordon (1983) to include
two political parties. Let be output, and be inflation. For
each party, the desired level of output is q, and the desired
level of inflation is zero. Utility in each period is a quadratic
function of the deviations of output and inflation from the target
levels. Thus:
- ( - + ) (3.1)
- fit(( -)2+ (3.2)14
=a(ire - (3.3)
E ) (3.4)
D.R
's
where isthe information set available at time (t -1)and
includes the past inflation rates and the entire history of the
game. Note that for concreteness we assume that party R is the
less inflationary party, i.e. R has a higher disutility of
inflation, since > The party that is in power selects the
policy variable (it)tomaximize its welfare function subject to
the structure of the economy. The state of the economy at time t
is given by the level ofinflation expectations at timet-l,
Each party wants to stabilize output q at a positive value
q. However, according to the "surprise" Phillips curve (3.3), and
the assumption of rational expectations (3.4), the average level
of output will be zero rather than q. It is assumed that the
probability that D will be elected is equal top (exogenously
given) while the probability that R elected is equal to (l-p).
Elections occur at the beginning of each period.
Define the value function for the two parties as:
vDDt =Max{[(q)2 + D2} + {pVDDt+l÷(1p)VRDt+l]) (3.5)
(itt)15
vRRt— Max([(qq)2 +Rir2i+[pVDRtl+(1p)VRRl]) (3.6)
subject to (3.3) and (3.4).
To find the time consistent solution to this problem we find
first the solution to the finite horizon problem and then take the
limit of this problem for the infinite horizon case. Suppose
period T is the final period so that —0.Assume, moreover,
that party i(i—D,R) isin power in period T. From the
optimization of (3.5) or (3.6), party i should set:
—dq i dw - q)_____+ rT _____— 0 (3.7)
dirT dirT
Differentiating(3.3) and substituting into (3.7)it can be
shown that the policy rule chosen by party i will be:
2
—
2
(TlirT) +
2
q (3.8)
The assumption of rational expectations implies that:
D R TlrT —E
irTI'T-l
— irT+(l-p)'T (3.9)16
Then substituting (3.9) in (3.8) we obtain:
2
D—
D
D+(1)R) +
a
D
(3.10)
2
R
R
D+(l-p)R) +
R
(3.11)
a+q
D Solving the system of equations (3.10) and (3.11) for ir T and
we then obtain the equilibrium solutions for the inflation
rates chosen by the two parties:
D a (a2+)
T
=_________________________________q > 0 (3.12)
R 2 2 DDR
4'a(l-p) + a 4'p+ 4' 4'
R a (a2+ 4'D)
T q > 0 (3.13)
R 2 2 DDR
4'a(l-p) + a 4'p+ 4' 4'
Equations(3.12) and (3.13) represent the reduced form
solutions for the inflation rate chosen by the two parties in
period T. Before discussing the properties of this equlibrium, one
should observe that these solutions will hold not only for the
terminal period T but also for all other periods of time as well.17
In fact, the original dynamic optimization problem can be reduced
to a series of static problems that are identical to the one
solved above. The reason for this is that the reduced form
solutions for the target variables depend only on an exogenous
variable (q)andnot on the state variable. Equations (3.12) and
(3.13) show that this is the case for the inflation rate and
simple substitutions can prove that the reduced forms for output
depend only on q as well.
It then follows that, in each stage of the intertemporal
optimization problem (3.5) or (3.6), V141 is a constant and
therefore will not affect the period t optimization problem. Then
the rules (3.8) for the policy variables will time independent and
identical in any period t, i.e.
2
D—
2D
+
a
D
q (3.8')
2
R—
2R
t-lt +
R
q (3.8'')
a-f-q
for every t. Similarly, the reduced form solution for inflation
and output chosen by the two parties will be the same in each time
period.
We can now consider the properties of this time-invariant18
equilibrium. The solution is time consistent and the economy has
an inflationary bias. In equilibrium, the inflation rate chosen by
both parties is positive and will be greater for partyD (the
party with the lower 4).Onecan also observe that the inflation
rate chosen by each party (when in power) depends not only on the
parameters of the loss function of that party but also on the
parameters of the other party arid on the probability of being
reelected.
Consider, in particular, the role of the probability of
reelection. It can be shown by differentiating (3.12) and (3.13)
that the inflation rate chosen by both parties is positively
related to the probability of election of the more inflationary
party D, i.e.
D 32 R RD
8ir a (a +)( - )
__________________________>0 (3.14)
R2 2D DR2
8p a (l-p)+crp+4
R 32 DRD 8ir
_________________________>0 (3.15)
R2 2D DR2
8p a (l-p)+a 4'p1-4'4'
Note,however, that the ratio between the inflation rates chosen
by the two parties is independent of this reelection probability.
In fact, ifwetake the ratio of ir't to lrRt from equations (3.12)19
and (3.13), we get:
D 2 R a +
______ —___________ (3.16)
R 2 D a +
whichis independent of the probabilty of reelection. This ratio
of inflation rates chosen by the two parties depends only on the
divergence of the policy objectives of the two parties as measured
by and 1), and the elasticity of output supply to inflation
(a). In particular, the more divergent are the policy objectives
of the two parties the greater is the divergence of the inflation
rates chosen by the two parties. Also, the greater is the output
supply elasticity a the closer are the inflation rates chosen by
the two parties.
The two major conclusions of this section are the following:
1) In the two party model analyzed above the policy rules
followed by the two parties (3.8) are time invariant and do not
depend on the reelection probabilities.
2) The reduced form solutions for the target variables chosen
by each party depend on both parties' parameters and the election
probabilities. Inparticular,bothpartiesbecomemore
inflationary as the probability of election of D (the more
inflationary party) increases.20
IV. A Two Period Model with Backward-Looking Expectations
The model presented in section III was easily solved in a
closed form because the intertemporal optimization problem was
shown to be reduceable to a series of static maximization
problems. In particular the policy rules were shown to be time
independent and not dependent on the relection probabilities.
Closed-form solutions for the inflation rates chosen by the two
parties were then derived and shown to hold in the same form for
any time period. These reduced forms for inflation turned out to
be dependent on the reelection probabilities.
More complex models cannot be reduced to a series of static
problems because the transition matrix will introduce true
dynamics in the problem (i.e. next period's value functions will
depend on today's control choices). In this section we present a
two-period version of a model similar to the one presented in
section III, derive a closed-form time-consistent solution for it,
and discuss the issue of policy selection of two parties in this
new setting.
Take a two period version of the two-party model introduced
in section III:
=- E1Et-l (q)2 +()2) (iD,R) (4.1)
a -t-lt (4.2)21
given at time 1 (4.3)
<
This problem was solved in section III for the case of rational
expectations. Now, assume instead that expectations are formed
according to a backward looking mechanism 8:
t1t (4.4)
Then substituting (4.4) in (4.2) the output supply function can be
written as:
a -"t-l (4.2')
Now define the value functions of the two parties as:
vDD1
— [(qD)2 +D(D)2]+fi[pVDD2+(lp)V'D2] (4.5)
for party D and:
=[(qR)2+R(.R)2]+fl[PVDR2+(1p)VRR2] (4.6)
8We use this example not for the realism of the expectation
assumption, but to illustrate certain methodological points.22
for party R, where:
=- [(qD)2+D(D)2] (4.7)
-[(qR)2+q'(R)2J (4.8)
p P 9 fl p9 --
VD2
=- [(q2)+ (4.9)
=- [(qD)2+R(D)2] (4.10)
One can generally observe that:
> for , (4.11)
> vR for (4.12)
i.e. the maximum utility that either party can reach in period 2
is greater if the party can optimize for itself in the period
considered. In other words, given different objective functions
for the two parties, if party R chooses 2 the welfare that D will
obtain must be less than the level that party D would reach if it
chooses 2 instead.
Now, consider the problem faced by the two parties in the
terminal period 2. At time 2party i (i D or R according to
which party is in power in period 2) has the following problem:23
Max —- [(q')2 +(,r1)j
i
(4.13)
subject to
q—a(i - (4.2'')
The first order condition for this problem is:
a [a(iri - ]+ qir1 —0 (i—D,R) (4.14)
Solving the system (14) for the values of ir2 we get:
2
—1pi (i—DR) where —___________(4.15)
a2 +
Substitutingthe solutions (4.15)in the equation for output
(4.2'') we obtain the solution for the output level chosen by the
two parties in period 2 as:
q—a(W-1) (i—R,D) (4.16)
The four value functions for period 2 are therefore:
—-a2[(a1)2 +()2](1)2 ED(1)2 (4.17)
—-(a2[(a 1)2 +R(,R)2]} (1)2 =- E'(l)2 (4.18)24
vRD2
— -(a[(aWR 1)2 +D(1,R)2]) (r)2 -ER(1)2 (4.19)
=-2[(q1D1)2 +(2] -
EDR2(l)2 (4.20)
Note that these value functions are quadratic in the first period
inflation rate, ir1. Moreover, simple computations can show that:
ER> D (4.21)
ED> R (4.22)
so that the results stated in (4.11) and (4.12) are confirmed.
Now let us go back to period 1. Consider first the case in
which party D is in power in period 1 (the case in which party R
is in power at 1 will be solved similarly). Party D's problem at
time 1 can be expressed as:
vDD1 — [(qD)2+D(D)2]+fi[pVDD2+(1p)V'D2] (4.5)
subject to (4.17), (4.19) and
D D
q 1a 1 -r0) (4.2''')
Taking the first order conditions for this problem we obtain after
several steps:
(a+ D a2 (4.23)25
where
—(a + (D 1)2 + +fl(1)(1R1)2-D(1]R)2)
Solving (4.23) for we get:
2
D a
ir 1 —_________ (4.24)
a' +
i.e.the inflation rate chosen by party D is a function of
inherited inflation and the output objective.
The question now becomes: what is the effect of a change in
the probability of reelection of party D on its choice of the
inflation rate in period 1 ? Will party D become more or less
expansionary as its probability of reelection increases ?More
formally we want to know what is the sign of (a,rD1/ap). Since p
affects only throughwe get:
D D
âir1 8ir1 8
op 8 8 p
3 3D R RD -a a ( -')(q-)
_____________ )( _______________________)> 0 (4.25)
(acD)2 (a2+)(a2+)226
The above derivative is always positive because the ternis in the
two brackets are both negative. The positive sign means that an
increase in p, the probability of election of party D, makes this
party more exiansionary (it will choose a higher level of
inflation at time 1 for anyi).Itcan be proved that the
opposite result holds for party R, i.e. ,a rise in p makes party R
more contractionary. Put another way, for either party an increase
in the election probability of that party makes that party more
expansionary. This result differs sustantially from the one
obtained in section III for the case of forward looking wage
setters, where a rise in the election probability for R made party
R more contractionary.
The intution behind the result on the election probability is
straightforward. Consider the problem from the point of view of D.
The expected value for D in the second period is
p vDD2 +i-pv'D2 We have shown that both V'D2 and VRD2 can be
written as quadratic functions of it1,theamount of inflation in
period 1:
D D 2
D2
=- E
D2 (4.17)
R R 2
D2
-ED2 (4.19)
Moreover, as pointed out earlier, it must be the case that
< ER since party D always benefits from itself being in
power in period 2. Thus, from party D's perspective, second period27
expected utility is:
p +(l-p)VRD2 —vRD2+p(VDD2 -vRD2)
—
— - ER(l)2 + (ER -ED)(1)2 (4.26)
Clearly, as party D's probability of election rises, i.e. as p
increases, the second Deriod cost to D of highl diminishes.
Thus the more likely it is that D will be in power in period 2,
the less costly is it for D to have a high inflation rate in
period 1. D therefore becomes more inflationary in period 1 as D's
probability of election increases.
Now consider the problem from R's perspective. Second-period
expected utility for R can be written as:
+ —v'R2+(1-
p)(VRR2
-v'R2)
—- EDR2(l)2 +(1-
p)(EDR2
-
ERR)(l)2 (4.27)
D R Once again, ER2exceeds ER2Thus, for R, the second-period cost
of diminishes as R's probability of reelection, l-p, rises.
Thus, will rise with 1-p ,andfall with p.
In sum, the more certain each party is of its second-period
tenure in office, the more inflationary it will be in the first
period. Since p is the probability of D in period 2, is a
rising function of p, and is a falling function of p.28
V. Simulation Results
This section presents the results of numerical simulations
obtained using the dynamic programming algorithm that solves the
linear-quadratic version of the two-party problems introduced in
section ii .Themodel used in this section to exemplify the
algorithm is a version of the model presented in section IV. There
the model was solved analytically for the two-period case; here it
is assumed that the policy-makers' programming horizon is infinite
and the numerical solution to this dynamic programming problem is
obtained. We are interested to find policy rules chosen by the two
parties and solutions for the target variables.
In order to use the solution algorithm we need to parametrize
10 the model; in particular, we assume that
=i =4 a 2 fi— 10/11
Table 1 presents the inflation rule and the equlibrium values of
the policy targets (inflation and output) chosen by the two
parties for different values of the reelection probabilities
A detailed derivation of this algorithm is presented in
section VI.
10It should be noted that the qualitative results obtained
below do not depend on the particular parameter choice but, as
seen in section IV, are a structural feature of the inflation
model used in these sections.
11Note that the inflation rate is the control variable and a
target variable at the same time.29
The results for the inflation rules of the two parties are
consistent with the parameter choice of R as a party more
R D concerned about inflation than party D (> ).Insetting the
inflation rate, when in power, party R accomodates past inflation
less than party D does (in table 1 the coefficient on inthe
inflation equation is always smaller for party R relative to party
D). However, the policy rules followed by the two parties depend
on thereelectionprobabilities. PartyRbecomesmore
contractionary as its reelection probability falls; in fact, R
accomodates 0.39 of past inflation when it is certain of relection
((l-p)..1) while it accomodates 0.36 of when its election
probability is zero. Similarly,partyDbecomesmore
contractionary (expansionary) when its election probability falls
(increases): D accomodates 0.63 of past inflation when it is
certain of reelection while it accomodates only 0.59 of past
inflation when its election probability is zero. These results for
the infinite horizon case confirm those obtained in section IV for
the two-period case.
It can also be seen from Table 1 that the results for the
other target variable, output, mirror those obtained for the
inflation rate: whenever the inflation policy of one party becomes
more contractionary,the outcome for output becomes more
contractionary as well.
The model chosen in this section to exemplify the solution
algorithm is very simple (one state variable and two targets). It
should, however, be obverved that the algorithm (derived inTABLE 1. BACKWARD LOOKING PRICE EXPECTATIONS
INFLATION RATE AND OUTPUT CHOSEN BY THE TWO PARTIES
P =Probabilityof election of party D
(1 -P)=Probabilityof election of party R
P=O
R 0.39
R
q—-1.21
D=0.59t-1
D
q -0.81 t-1
P0.5
R 0.38
R
q=-1.23
—0.60t-1
q -0.78
P—l
R=0.36
R
q -1.27
D=0.63t-l
D
q=-0.73t-l30
section VI) is very general in that it can handle models with any
number of state, jumping, control and target variables where
closed-form solutions could not be otherwise obtained.
VI. The General Dynamic Programming Solution of the Linear-
Quadratic Problem Under a Two-Party Political System
This section describes the general solution technique to
solve the two-party optimization problem introduced in section II.
We will show that time consistent solutions for this two-party
infinite horizon dynamic game can be obtained through a technique
of dynamic programming for the general class of problems where the
objective function of the two parties is quadratic and the
transition matrix is linear12
Consider the linear formulation of the state-space model
presented in section II. Partition the state vectorZ between
between a vector of predetermined state variables CX) and a vector
of jumping variables (e). The model can be written as
X1 _AX+Be+CTJ (6.1)
—DX +Fe +CUt (6.2)
r —MX+Le +NU (6.3) t t t t
12In the single controller case this class of linear-
quadratic problems leads to the optimal linear regulator problem
of dynamic programming. See Sargent (1987) for details.31
where:
X is a vector of state variables (predetermined)
e is a vector of jumping variables
U is a vector of control variables
risa vector of target variables
13
E ( e+i
There are two political parties labeled party D and party R
characterized by the different objective functions (2.3) and
(2.4). Elections take place at the beginning of every period t and
the elected party chooses the control variables for period t. The
probability of election of each party is given and taken as
exogenous: party D is elected with probability p and party R is
elected with probability (l-p). The four value functions for D and
R are given by (2.7), (2.8), (2.10) and (2.11).
In order to solve this optimization problem with two parties
we need to find time-invariant party-specific matrices
(iD,R) for the linear policy rules of the two parties:
—r1x (i=D,R) (6.4)
and time-invariant matrices s, sRt), such that:
13The model can be easily extended to consider the case in
which exogenous variables and expected state variables appear in
the model representation. The numerical algorithm written by the
authors explictily considers these additional types of variables
and an analytical derivation is available upon request.32
(X)
—- sD x (6.5)
X) —- x'sRR X (6.6)
(X)
-XsR X (6.7)
(X)
—- X (6.8)
Note that (6.5) is defined by the problem (2.7) subject to (6.1)
to (6.3) and (6.6) is defined by the problem (2.10) subject to
(6.1) to (6.3).
We also need to find party-specific matrices Hi1 that ensure
that the jumping variables adjust to keep the model on the stable
manifold:
e1 H1X (i—D,R) (6.9)
where i is the party in power at time t.
The iterative technique which solves this problem is
similar to the dynamic programming procedure used for the case of
unique social planner. We begin by converting the infinite period
problem into a finite period problem where the terminal period is
some arbitrary period T. Then we can solve the problem for the
terminal period T twice: in one case we assume that party D is in
power at T and in the other case we assume that party R is in
power at time T. With these results, we solve for period T-1, and33
by induction, for all periods until the first period.
Assume that in period T+1 the jumping variables and the
expected state variables have stabilized and that the value
functions for T+1 are equal to zero. This implies:
TeT+l eT (6.10)
Using (6.10) in (6.2) and we get:
eTP1XT+P2 UT (6.11)
where: =(I-F)1D
(I -F)1G
Now, take (6.11) and substitute it into (6.3) to obtain an
expression for the targets at time T as a function of the states
and the control variables at time T:
TT l XT +2UT (6.12)
where: (M +L1)
=(N+L$2)
Suppose now that party i is in power in period T. I will be equal
to D or R according to which party is in power in the terminal34
period T. Since T is the terminal period VT÷l_O and the problem
faced by party i will be:
Max -fiTrT ?T (6.13)
UT
subject to (6.12) or:
Max -flT(XT +2UT)1l(7l XT +2IJ1T) (6.13')
UT
The first order conditions for this problem will be:
'l XT +12 '2 UT —0 (6.14)
that can be written in compact form as:
MMT UiT —- NNTXT (6.15)
i i where MMT
—2
i ,i NNT2
i Solving for UTwe get:
U1T —rTXT (6.16)
where: rT —- (MMiT)lNN1T
The next step is to take the policy rule (6.16), substitute it in
(6.11) to obtain the values of the jumping variables when party i35
is in power at time T. It is obvious that the values assumed by
jumping variables will differ depending on which party is in power
at time T. We will then get:
eT H1T XT (6.17)
4
where:HT l +2TT
At this point it is possible to take the above rules for the
policy variables and the jumping variablesand substitute them
back in the equations for ther target variables (block (6.3)) for
period T. Doing so we obtain the values of the targets when party
i is in power at time T as a function of the state variables at
time T:
rT —[M +LH1T +NrT I XT (6.18)
Substituting these solutions for the targets in the value
functions of ther two parties for time T (6.13) and equating these
solutions to the guess solution for these value functions
(equations (6.5) to (6.8)) we can obtain the initial starting
guesses for the S's matrices for time T:
s'DT =(M+LHDT+N r'T)' (D (N-i-L HDT+N r'T)
SRRT (M+L HRT+N rT) (.1R (M+L HRT+N TRT)36
s'RT —(M+LHDT+N D) (M+L HDT+N r'T)
sRDT —(M+LHRT+N r'T)' D (M+L HRT+N rRT)
Given the value function in each period ,wecan solve the
problem in any period t. Consider then the problem for period t.
At time t the state of the system is described by:
X4.1 =AX+Be+CU (6.1)
—DX +Fe +CUt (6.2)
We therefore need an expression for e+1; from the solution for
the problem for period t÷l we know that:
e÷1HD+l X1 (6.19)
if party D is in power at t+l and:
e÷i HRt+l X÷1 (6.19')
if party R is in power.
It must then be the case that as of time t:
=E( e÷i I =
p(HD+lX+i) +(lp)(H't÷1X+i)
H*t÷l X1 (6.20)37
where:
H*t÷l =pHDt÷l + (l-p) HRt÷l (6.21)
Then, if we substitute (6.20) in (6.2) we can obtain an expression
for the jumping variables at t as a function of state and control
variables:
e lt X + 2t Ut (6.22)
* -l *
where:lt —(Ht+lB -F)(D -Ht÷1A)
(H*t+1B -F)1(G-H*t÷lC)
Substitution of (6.22) in the equations for the state variables at
t+l (6.1) and the target variables (6.3) allow us to express the
values of these variables at t as a function of thestate and
control variables at time t:
t+l01t t + 92t t (6.23)
7lt t + 12t Ut (6.24)
where:01t=A+BP1t 82=C+B2t
11t =M+ Llt 72t =N+ L2t38
Wecan now consider the optimization problem faced by party D
assuming that this is the party in power at time t (a similar
optimization problem can be obtained by assuming that R is in
power at t). As seen above the value function of party D at t will
be:
vDDt —Max( -rt'Dr+fi[pv'Dt+l + (l-p) ) (2.7)
Given our definitions of the guesses for the value functions of
the 2 parties in (6.5) to (6.8) we can rewrite (2.7) as:
vDDt —Maxr' +fi[p[X1'sDDt+l X+i] +
+ [(lp)[X+i' s'Dt+l x+l1
—Max( D + Xt+ls s11 Xt+1}) (2.7')
t
D D R where: S SDt+l+ (l-p)
Dt+1. (6.25)
We can then substitute the equations (6.23) and (6.24) in (2.7')
and compute the following first order conditions:
+02t s't+l 01t' t +
+92t 02t1 u' —0 (6.26)39
that can be rewritten as:
NNDtX + MMDt uDt =
0 (6.27)
Then solving for we get:
—r'X (6.28)
where: rDt =(MMDtyJNN'
that represents the rule for the control variables followed by
party D if it is in power at time t.
We can similarly find the policy rule followed by party R if
we assume that this is the party in power at t. We would then
maximize the value function (2.10) (instead of (2.7)) that is the
one relative to party R. Then, repeating the procedure for R we
would get the following policy rule:
—rx (6.28')
where: rRt-(MM't) NNR
Substituting these rules in (6.22) (equations for e) we then get
thestablemanifoldforthejumping variablesassuming
alternatively that D or R is in power at t:40
e —H1X (i—D,R) (6.29)
where: + 2t nt (i—D,R)
Then, through substitutions of the policy rules (6.28) and of the
jumping variable rules (6.34) in the equations (6.23) and (6.24),
we can finally express the state vector X1 and the targets r as
functions of the states when party i is in power at time t:
Xi1 =EitX (i—D,R) (6.30)
nt — (i=D,R) (6.31)
where: 91t + 02t nt (i—D,R)
+ 72t rt (i=D,R)
Finallywe can go back to the value functions (2.7'), (2.8)
(2.10) and (2.11) for the two parties, substitute back the
solutions for states and targets ((6.30)-(6.3l)) and obtain
general recursion rules for the S matrices:
SDDt = D D +ED, SDt+l EDt) (6.32)
t' R +E'' SRt+l E') (6.33)41
sRDt = D R + ZR s'+l ER) (6.34)
sDRt(çDIRD + ED sR+1 ED) (6.35)
We have therefore derived recursion rules and starting values for
the policy rules of the two parties (equations (6.28) and
(6.28')), for the jumping variables (equations (6.29)) and for the
matrices defining the value functions (6.5) to (6.8). Then the
time consistent solution is the stationary solution to which the
system converges for t=.O as T goes to infinity. The backward
recursion procedure is repeated until the rule matrices converge
to a stable time-independent value. We do not know of a general
proof of convergence in the presence of jumping variables, but
havein practice experienced no difficulties in achieving
convergence.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we have modelled the effects of electoral
competition on the formulation of policies by rival political
parties. In a sense, we look at the flip side of the political
business cycle approach. In PBC models, competing politicians do
not have intrinsic preferences over alternative policies; they
choose policies only to improve their chances for election or42
reelection. In the partisanship models discussed in this paper,
the parties differ in their intrinsic preferences, presumably
because the parties represent distinct constituencies of voters.
The difference in approach is highlighted by our assumption of a
constant, exogenous probability of reelection of each party.
We demonstrate that each political party adjusts the optimal
rule that it would follow in the absence of political competition
from the other party. In fighting inflation, for example, the
optimal rate of disinflation for each party depends on the chance
of the other party coming to power. In general, both parties opt
for a more rapid rate of disinflation the higher is the chance
that the other party will come to power in a future election.
Using dynamic programming techniques, we provide an algorithm
for solving for the policy equilibrium of the two parties, given
quadratic objectives, a linear dynamic structure, and exogenous
election probabilities.
There are two major extensions to the analysis which we
should like to mention briefly. First, it would be useful to
extend the model to make the electoral probabilities a function of
the policies pursued by the two parties and/or the performance of
the economy during their tenure in office. Alesina (1986) has
taken an important step in this direction. Second, it would be
useful to expand the types of strategic interactions that are
allowed for between the two parties. In particular, if the parties
can base the current policies not merely on the current state of
the economy, but also on the past history of the economy, then far43
richer kinds of equilibria can be found. For example, the parties
may find it to be in their common interest to converge to a common
set of policies, with such convergenge sustained by the mutual
threat that if either party diverges from the common policies,
then the other party will revert to party-specific policies to the
detriment of the other party. Such an equilibrium of course
requires a history-dependent strategy for each party, which has
been so far ruled out in this paper. Once again, see Alesina
(1986) for some results in this area.44
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